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ABSTRACT
Social policy towards indigenous Australians was fundamentally rethought
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The result is the current involvement in
this policy area of large numbers of government agencies and programs
across the range of functional responsibilities and at both State and
Commonwealth levels of Australian government. The involvement of such
a multiplicity of agencies and programs has recently been much criticised,
most notably in the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody.
The alternative suggested by such critics is 'block grants' to Aboriginal
community organisations from a single funding source. This idea is
characterised as a suggestion for another fundamental rethinking of social
policy towards indigenous Australians.
This paper cautions against the uncritical acceptance of this latter reformist
idea and proposes that when the Royal Commission's Report is read more
broadly, its ambivalence towards its own reformist suggestion becomes
clear. It also notes the Commonwealth Government's ambivalence to this
idea in its response. The paper goes on to provide a more positive
perspective on the large numbers of agencies and programs currently
involved in implementing social policy towards indigenous Australians
under the sub-headings of manoeuvrability, visibility, amount and diversity
of Aboriginal circumstances. Finally, it argues that there is potential for
reform in social policy towards indigenous Australians, but that this is
primarily at the level of programs, rather than agencies. The Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Commission's program structure, in particular, is
discussed and lines of potential reform briefly identified.
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Foreword
In response to a call for papers for the 1993 National Social Policy
Conference with the theme Theory and Practice in Australian Social
Policy: Rethinking the Fundamentals', academics at the Centre for
Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National University,
submitted three inter-related abstracts with the following titles:
i 'Indigenous Australians and social policy: rethinking the
fundamentals' (J.C. Altman and W.G. Sanders);
ii 'The role of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission in
social policy towards indigenous Australians' (J.C. Altman and D.E.
Smith); and
iii 'Work and welfare for indigenous Australians' (A.E. Daly and A.E.
Hawke).
It was anticipated that all three papers would be earmarked for a special
session on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander issues convened in
recognition of the 1993 United Nations International Year of the World's
Indigenous People. However, the conference organisers only slotted the
first proposal into this session; the second was included in the stream
'Social Policy and the Economy', and the third in the stream 'Work and
Welfare1.
Subsequently, the title of the proposed first paper changed to 'Rethinking
the fundamentals of social policy towards indigenous Australians: block
grants, mainstreaming and the multiplicity of agencies and programs', and
Dr Will Sanders wrote the paper as sole author. A version of this paper has
been submitted for inclusion in the conference proceedings, but it is also
published as a CAEPR discussion paper to make it available immediately
to an audience focusing on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander social
policy.
Jon Altman
Series Editor
September 1993
It is fairly widely understood in the Australian community that social
policy towards indigenous Australians underwent a fundamental rethinking
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The existing system, which largely
excluded Aborigines from mainstream social policy and placed them
instead under restrictive bodies of law administered by State and Territory
Aboriginal protection/welfare authorities, was being rapidly wound down;
except in Queensland.1 In its place was emerging a new approach which
combined general Aboriginal inclusion in mainstream instruments of
Australian social policy, such as the social security system, with an
expanding and dramatically revised nationwide Commonwealth presence
in Aboriginal-specific programs and policies. This new Commonwealth
approach placed far more emphasis on Aboriginal people themselves
taking a hand in policy-making and service delivery structures which
affected their lives; a point which the Whitlam government attempted to
capture in 1972 when it adopted the term 'self-determination' as the central
principle of Aboriginal policy. The intent of this revised and expanded
Commonwealth presence was not, however, to drive the States out of
Aboriginal policy and service delivery, but rather to encourage them to
participate in the new revised approach alongside the Commonwealth.
Prime Minister Whitlam, addressing State ministers for Aboriginal affairs
in 1973, noted that, in establishing a fully-fledged Commonwealth
Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA), his government's intention was
not to create an 'omnibus' department with responsibility for all Aboriginal
needs, like some super-sized State or Territory Aboriginal welfare
authority, but rather that the new Department would:
instead seek to devolve upon a wide range of Federal, State and local authorities,
as well as upon organisations of Aboriginals themselves, responsibility for
carrying out the policies decided upon by my Government. These authorities
would be responsible for Aboriginals in the same matters and in the same way as
they are now functionally responsible for the community generally (Australian
Government Digest, April-June 1973: 697).
Over the next twenty years, as Whitlam's vision was gradually being
realised, social policy towards indigenous Australians changed from its
previous clear containment in single State and Territory agencies to being
far more disparate. It now involves large numbers of Commonwealth and
State government organisations across the range of functional
responsibilities, as well as Aboriginal-specific bodies ranging from the
national to the local level.
This fundamentally reformed structure of social policy towards indigenous
Australians, which has developed over the last twenty years, has now itself
become the object of considerable criticism. The focus of this criticism has
been on the sheer number of agencies and programs now involved in
providing services and funding to Aboriginal people, both as individuals
and as groups, and the apparent lack of coordination and clarity of roles
between them. Some critics have suggested that the way to resolve these
problems would be to adopt a system of 'block grants' to Aboriginal
communities. Precisely what is meant by this term is not always fully
explained. However, on any interpretation, it would seem to involve
another fundamental rethinking of social policy towards indigenous
Australians.
My aim in this paper is to urge some caution in relation to this apparently
alluring reformist idea. I begin in the next section by documenting the
multiplicity of agencies and programs now involved in social policy
towards indigenous Australians and recounting some of the criticisms of
this institutional structure that have been made over recent years. The most
notable criticism has been in the National Report of the Royal Commission
into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and I use this report as a convenient
statement of the reformist 'block grants' position (Commonwealth of
Australia 1991a, 1991b). I note, however, that the Royal Commission
seemed somewhat ambivalent about how far it wanted to push the idea, as
did the Commonwealth Government in its response to the Royal
Commission. I then provide a more positive perspective on the
involvement of a multiplicity of agencies in funding and delivering
services to indigenous Australians under the sub-headings of
manoeuvrability, visibility, amount and diversity of Aboriginal
circumstances. Having thus defended the current structure, I do not,
however, wish to be misconstrued as defending the proposition that there is
no need or potential for reform at all in social policy towards indigenous
Australians. In the final section, I briefly outline some changes, at the level
of programs rather than agencies, which I think could usefully be made.
The multiplicity of agencies and programs and the block grants
critique
There is no doubt that social policy towards indigenous Australians has
been characterised in recent years by the involvement of a growing number
of government agencies and programs. A listing of Commonwealth
indigenous assistance programs during the 1980s contained expenditure in
seven portfolios in 1980-81, rising to nine portfolios in 1983-87
(Department of Aboriginal Affairs 1987). The listing for 1991-92 identified
expenditure of $1,161 million in 15 ministerial portfolios through no less
than 70 Aboriginal-specific programs and 36 mainstream programs with a
specific Aboriginal element (see Tables 1 and 2 and Commonwealth of
Australia 1992a). The listing also identified a further 72 mainstream
Commonwealth programs with particular relevance to Aborigines, but in
which expenditure on them was only rarely separately identified, or
identifiable (see Table 2).
Table 1. Commonwealth Aboriginal-specific expenditure by portfolio,
1991-92.
Amount
Portfolio ($ million)
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs 590
Employment, Education and Training3 390
Aboriginal Study Assistance Scheme (105)
Aboriginal Education Strategic Initiatives (74)
Training for Aboriginals Program (96)
Health, Housing and Community Services3 143
Aboriginal Rental Housing (91)
Services for Families with Children Program (17)
Arts, Sport, Environment and Territories 10.5
Social Security 7.3
Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs 7.2
Transport and Communications 4.7
Primary Industries and Energy 2.6
Prime Minister and Cabinet 2.4
Administrative Services 1.2
(including Australian Electoral Commission)
Defence 0.8
Attorney-General's 0.6
(including Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission)
Foreign Affairs and Trade 0.2
Industrial Relations 0.2
Treasury (Australian Bureau of Statistics) 0.1
Total 1,161
a. Indented figures are major identified components.
Source: Commonwealth of Australia (1992a).
To this Commonwealth presence needs to be added State or Territory
expenditure and programs. Although probably not quite as extensive in
terms of overall expenditure, the State or Territory contribution is still
significant, and certainly also comes from an equally diverse array of
programs and agencies. Arthur (1992), for example, estimated that in
Western Australia, in 1990-91, the State government spent $36 million of
its own general revenue on Aboriginal-specific programs, $10 million of
which was spent by its Aboriginal affairs planning authority and the
remainder by functional state authorities in areas such as education,
employment, health, housing and community services and law and order.
Smith (1992) estimated that in the Northern Territory in 1990-91 some
$302 million was probably spent on services to Aborigines through as
many as 49 different programs. This was primarily spent through
mainstream programs and all through mainstream functional government
agencies, as at that time the Northern Territory Government had no specific
Aboriginal affairs agency (see Mowbray 1990). Aboriginal-specific
programs only accounted for $15 million or 5 per cent of this expenditure
and mainstream programs with a specific Aboriginal element $103 million
or 34 per cent (Smith 1993).
Table 2. Numbers of Commonwealth Aboriginal programs by
functional area.
Mainstream Mainstream
with specific with particular
Functional Aboriginal- Aboriginal relevance to
area specific3 element
Education
Health
Social security and welfare
Housing and community amenities
Culture and recreation
Transport and communications
Industry assistance and development
Labour and employment
Law, order and public safety
Assistance to local governments
General and other
Total
11
5 (2)
12 (2)
4 (3)
15 (15)
5 (4)
7 (4)
7 (2)
4 (2)
70 (34)
2
6
2
3
8
4
4
1
2
4
36
Aborigines
4
10
12
3
14
12
7
10
72
a. Aboriginal affairs portfolio number in brackets.
Source: Commonwealth of Australia (1992a).
This involvement of a vast multiplicity of agencies and programs in social
policy towards indigenous Australians attracted the attention of the Royal
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. Its National Report
contained a section entitled 'The Multiplicity of Funding Agencies' which
commented, inter alia, as follows:
Many critiques have been written about the extent to which the multiplicityof
government agencies (which, at all levels, maintain programs relating to
Aboriginal people) serves to diminish the prospect of self-determination and
self-management of these (Aboriginal) communities ...
Departments and agencies are constantly coming to communities with programs,
proposals to do assessments and feasibility studies. I heard of committees
dealing with up to thirty-five bodies. They are submerged in people wanting to
consult... This is obviously very frustrating for communities and appears to be
inefficient. One can also see very well the difficulty ... about control and setting
priorities ... when funding comes from so many sources and is tied in so many
ways. But above and beyond this the whole process can only tend to take
decision-making power out of Aboriginal hands. The communities are constantly
responding to agendas promoted from outside, rather than setting their own
agenda and then negotiating about relevant matters...
The multiplicity of funding agencies, the obvious overlap between many
programs from one department to another, the apparent competition for
programs to be adopted by Aboriginal communities all present a grossly
complex and unwieldy environment which is hardly conducive to effective self-
determination and self-management.So far as I can see, no Aboriginal individual
or organisation, anywhere, has asked for this complex multi-layered,
bureaucratic and organisational picture to be the reality of Aboriginal self-
determination and self-management. All of these arrangements are the product of
non-Aboriginal bureaucratic and political notions of the organisational needs and
program needs for Aboriginal communities. There is a quite tragic waste of time
and money involved in the maintenance of such a ludicrously complicated
funding super-structure (Commonwealth of Australia 199 Ib: 13-15).
Amongst this criticism, the Royal Commission also expressed the view that
the 'ideal situation' would be that all funds provided for Aboriginal
communities come through a 'single source' (Commonwealth of Australia
1991b: 14). Accordingly, at the end of its section on the multiplicity of
funding agencies, the Royal Commission made two recommendations, the
first of which, number 190, suggested that:
the Commonwealth Government, in conjunction with the State and Territory
Governments, develop proposals for implementing a system of block grant
funding of Aboriginal communities and organisations (Commonwealth of
Australia 1991b: 21).
The second, recommendation 191, suggested that these governments:
develop means by which all sources of funds provided for or identified as being
available to Aboriginal communities or organisations wherever possible be
allocated through a single source with one set of audit and financial requirements
but with the maximum devolution of power to the communities and
organisations to determine the priorities for allocation of such funds
(Commonwealth of Australia 1991b: 21).
These recommendations were not, as the Royal Commission recognised,
breaking entirely new ground. The first, in particular, had been consciously
cast in terms similar to a recommendation of a recent report of the House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs (1990). One
earlier influential unofficial report had also recommended the idea of 'block
grants' with allocations based on a process of 'submissions and assessments
of needs' following 'a Commonwealth Grants Commission model'
(Coombs, McCann, Ross and Williams 1989).
These calls for block grants and a single funding source sound very much
like a call for another fundamental rethinking of social policy towards
indigenous Australians. On being informed that, in 1992, the
Commonwealth Government gave its support to all but one of the Royal
Commission's 339 recommendations, including the above two, one could
be excused for believing that such a fundamental rethinking of social
policy towards indigenous Australians was presently under way. But this is
not so. On a wider reading of both the Royal Commission and the
Commonwealth Government's response, it becomes clear that neither of
these bodies was in fact entirely convinced of the merits of the block grant
proposal.
The Royal Commission, mainstreaming and block grants: a wider
reading
The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody was not
generally of the view that social policy towards indigenous Australians
needed fundamental rethinking. It was, in fact, largely supportive of the
developments which had occurred in social policy towards indigenous
Australians since the late 1960s and early 1970s. It strongly endorsed the
idea of 'self-determination' as the appropriate policy principle and sought,
in its deliberations, to make suggestions which 'if adopted, may result in a
more meaningful application of the principle' (see Commonwealth of
Australia 199la: 503-20, 1991b: 5). It also enthusiastically endorsed the
new role in policy-making and service delivery of Aboriginal
organisations, the 'growth and effectiveness' of which it claimed to be 'one
of the most remarkable developments in the last twenty years'
(Commonwealth of Australia 1991b: 22). It looked to these Aboriginal
organisations as providing the 'best hope' for achieving fuller self-
determination in the future (Commonwealth of Australia 1991b: 24).
This enthusiastic support for Aboriginal organisations put the Royal
Commission somewhat at odds with the other major institutional
development in social policy towards indigenous Australians of the last
twenty years; the parallel inclusion of Aborigines in more mainstream
functional service delivery structures at all levels of Australian
government. The Whitlam vision did, in retrospect, have a major internal
tension here, in that it encouraged the servicing of Aborigines, both by
mainstream Commonwealth, State and local government agencies, and by
Aboriginal organisations. It encouraged the development of what have
become, in a sense, two competing constituencies of Aboriginal service
agencies: the Aboriginal community-based agencies, funded primarily,
though not exclusively, from the Commonwealth Aboriginal affairs
portfolio, and more mainstream functional government agencies. The
former organisations, often fairly small and meagrely resourced, have
increasingly observed mainstream expenditure on servicing Aborigines and
coveted it as their own. The latter, on the other hand, have been placed in
the somewhat invidious position of being criticised if they don't service
Aborigines, but also criticised if they do. In strongly supporting the
Aboriginal community-based agencies, the Royal Commission was,
necessarily, also drawn into taking a position in relation to the mainstream
agencies.
The block grants and single funding source idea would seem, on one
reading, not to admit very much of a role for mainstream functional
agencies of government in servicing Aborigines. Certainly there are times,
in its National Report, when the Royal Commission was fairly dismissive
of the role of mainstream organisations. In a section entitled 'The Role of
Aboriginal Organisations and Mainstreaming Policies' the Royal
Commission argued that it would be 'thoroughly undesirable' to insist upon
'mainstreaming in service provision' for Aborigines because of 'narrowly
focussed notions of efficiency and effectiveness' (Commonwealth of
Australia 1991b: 24). It then went on to argue that:
self-determination cannot be a reality if governments fail to recognize that
Aboriginal people have clearly voiced their preference for using Aboriginal
organisations; not only as their negotiators, but as the agents for delivering
services. The Aboriginal organisations, when given adequate funding and when
placed in a position in which they are respected negotiators and service
deliverers, have performed much more effectively than the majority of
mainstream agencies have performed in relation to Aboriginal people. They are
trusted, they know and respect Aboriginal society and culture and they enhance
self-respect within the Aboriginal community as they fulfil their roles
(Commonwealth of Australia 1991b: 25-6).
Accordingly, the Royal Commission's recommendation 192 stated:
That in the implementation of any policy or program which will particularly
affect Aboriginal people the delivery of the program should, as a matter of
preference, be made by such Aboriginal organisations as are appropriate to
deliver services pursuant to the policy or program on a contractual basis
(Commonwealth of Australia 1991b: 29).
Only where no 'appropriate' Aboriginal community-based organisation is
available should 'any agency of government' deliver the service; and then it
should do so 'in consultation' with 'Aboriginal organisations and
communities' to ensure that the services and delivery processes are
'appropriate' (Commonwealth of Australia 1991b: 29).
Amongst these strong anti-mainstreaming ideas were, however, some
different sentiments. The Royal Commission noted in passing that there are
instances in which mainstream and Aboriginal community-based
organisations 'work comfortably' alongside each other, in areas such as
health and housing services (Commonwealth of Australia 1991b: 25, 34). It
also noted that:
Aboriginal interests appear ... to recognize that there are 'mainstream' services
which can only soundly be delivered by mainstream agencies, and Aboriginal
people are willing users of many mainstream services such as Medicare,
Commonwealth Employment Service (CES), ambulance services, hospital
services, library services, tertiary education services, court services and others
(Commonwealth of Australia 1991b: 25).
In discussing the roles of the Commonwealth's Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Commission (ATSIC) and its Department of Employment,
Education and Training (DEET) in the Aboriginal Employment
Development Policy (AEDP), a major policy initiative of the mid 1980s
which saw expenditure on Aboriginal-specific employment programs
increase significantly, the Royal Commission noted that there will be:
many situations where it would be inappropriate for ATSIC to duplicate the
functions of a government department which provides specialist services under its
own budget and programs (Commonwealth of Australia 1991b: 18-19).
All this would seem to suggest that while the Royal Commission was clear
in its wish to encourage the further development of Aboriginal community-
based organisations, it was not so clear in its attitude to mainstream
organisations servicing Aboriginal people. To the extent that the block
grants and single funding source ideas seemed to suggest that these
organisations had little or no role to play, they seemed to be somewhat
overstating the Royal Commission's position. Indeed, at one point the
Royal Commission expressed considerable reservations about its own
block grants proposal, saying the idea was 'not without its difficulties':
Consider, for example, a scenario in which a community is allocated funds by an
ATSIC Regional Council on the basis of an assessment of the health needs of all
communities and organisations in the council's region. What should be the
response of government, or of ATSIC, if a community then decided that instead
of allocating those funds to health needs it decided instead to spend the money
on lighting or transport needs?
In this illustration it could be said that the community had spoken - it had
applied the principle of self-determination to set its own priorities- and so it had.
But might government not have a legitimate concern to ensure that the health
needs of citizens were not being denied? Might the Regional Council not have a
similar concern that its careful assessment of competing needs in the health area
and its budget allocation to the relevant community or organisation would have
been different had it known the purpose for which the funds were to be applied?
If the funding came through ATSIC was that not also a process of self-
determination which it had applied in making its allocation of funds between
communities? (Commonwealth of Australia 1991b: 19-20).
The above leads me to suggest that the Royal Commission into Aboriginal
Deaths in Custody was somewhat ambivalent about its block grant/single
funding source proposal and about driving the mainstream service delivery
organisations away from servicing Aborigines. The Royal Commission
was, I believe, on a wider reading, far more committed to continuing and
extending the social policy approach towards indigenous Australians of the
last 25 years, than in any serious way overturning or fundamentally
rethinking that approach.
The Commonwealth Government's response to the Royal Commission
It is also interesting to note the Commonwealth Government's response to
the two recommendations of the Royal Commission relating to block
grants and single funding sources. Beyond its formal utterance of 'support',
the Commonwealth Government diffused the fundamental policy
implications of the first of these recommendations by stating that ATSIC:
already adopts block grant arrangements within programs where organisations
and communities have demonstrated a capacity to cope with this form of
funding (Commonwealth of Australia 19925: 725).
On this interpretation, block grants were not seen as anything radically new
or fundamentally different from what already existed. The Commonwealth
was willing to say that it would work with the State and Territory
governments 'to examine the options for further expansion of this approach'
(Commonwealth of Australia 1992b: 725). However, since it had already
re-interpreted the block grant idea to equate with what already existed in
ATSIC, expansion of the approach could hardly be seen as fundamental
change.
In relation to the recommendation about a single funding source, the
Commonwealth agreed that the 'objective of minimising the number' of
funding sources should be pursued. However, it went on to say that:
different tiers of Government with different responsibilities, using the same
corporate entity to pursue different objectives, make it inevitable that multiple
sources of funding will continue to exist (Commonwealth of Australia 1992b:
729).
Hence, although the Commonwealth formally supported both of these
recommendations, this support was in fact largely without substance. The
Commonwealth was not greatly receptive to either of these
recommendations. It seemed as yet unconvinced of the need to
fundamentally rethink social policy towards indigenous Australians in the
direction of block grants and a single funding source and away from the
trends of the last twenty years.
Mainstreaming and the multiplicity of agencies: a more positive
perspective
My approach to the multiplicity of agencies currently involved in social
policy towards indigenous Australians has long been more positive than
that of the reformist critics. I take the view that the growing number of
agencies involved in funding and servicing Aborigines has in fact been a
very central and beneficial part of the development of social policy towards
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indigenous Australians over the last 20 years. There are a number of
reasons for this, which I will discuss under the labels of manoeuvrability,
visibility, amount and diversity of Aboriginal circumstances.
Manoeuvrability
It is a fairly widely held view that the degree of Aboriginal autonomy in
relation to the larger society and nation state has increased significantly
over the last twenty years (Tonkinson and Howard 1990). This is often
related, as in the Royal Commission, to the emergence of effective
Aboriginal organisations. However, it is seldom also related to that other
half of developments in social policy towards indigenous Australians over
these years; the growing multiplicity of servicing and funding agencies. An
argument can be made that the growing multiplicity of service delivery and
funding sources for Aborigines over the past twenty years has, in fact,
played a major part in the increased potential for Aboriginal
manoeuvrability in relation to government and the larger society, and
particularly in relation to any one government agency. What Aborigines
cannot achieve or obtain through one government agency under one guise,
might just be achievable, under a slightly different guise, through another.
Gerritsen (1982a, 1982b) was probably the first to put this argument
seriously, and both he and I have repeated it since (Gerritsen 1990; Sanders
1991). The Royal Commission gave the argument some passing credence
when it admitted, somewhat off-handedly, the possibility that the Very
vagueness of current understandings' about the responsibilities of various
agencies might provide an 'opportunity for communities to maximise the
level of funding' flowing to themselves, rather than restrict it
(Commonwealth of Australia 1991b: 13). Elsewhere, it also noted that
where 'co-ordination' and clarity of responsibility between government
agencies had been a 'fact of life' in Queensland from the mid 1970s to the
early 1980s, this had generally not been seen as 'producing the best
possible results for Aboriginal communities' (Commonwealth of Australia
1991a: 538). Queensland had not, in those years, yet fully escaped from the
old Aboriginal welfare authority regime of earlier years, which was in
many ways a single funding source for Aboriginal people. Now that it has,
perhaps Aborigines there too are beginning to enjoy some of the increased
potential for manoeuvrability which has flowed from the multiplicity of
rather poorly coordinated servicing and funding agencies.
Visibility
Current institutional arrangements for social policy towards indigenous
Australians combine highly visible expenditure on Aboriginal people
through Commonwealth and State Aboriginal affairs portfolios with
slightly less visible expenditure through Aboriginal-specific program
elements in mainstream portfolios and the largely invisible inclusion of
Aborigines in mainstream programs of mainstream portfolios. One of the
great virtues of mainstream service provision for Aborigines which is often
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overlooked is this invisibility. Conversely, one of the weaknesses of
Aboriginal-specific programs, particularly when isolated in Aboriginal
affairs portfolios, is their ready identifiability as 'special' expenditure on
Aborigines. ATSIC clearly has a problem here. I can already see the
newspaper headlines a couple of years hence, when ATSIC is billed as
Australia's $1 billion Aboriginal affairs body. Few will read far enough
into the articles that follow to discover that a significant proportion of this
expenditure is on a program, the Community Development Employment
Projects (CDEP) scheme, in which Aborigines forgo the right to Jobsearch
and Newstart allowances from the Department of Social Security (DSS)
and work instead for an equivalent amount for their local Aboriginal
community association/council.2 This expenditure should arguably,
therefore, be thought of as social security expenditure.
There will, of course, be no headlines a couple of years hence saying that in
all probability there is just as much money flowing to Aborigines as
personal income from the social security system proper as from ATSIC
(Altman and Smith 1992), since this is largely invisible expenditure which
Aborigines are entitled to along with other Australian citizens. Indeed, the
social security system is probably the best example of the invisibility of
important mainstream government expenditure on Aboriginal people.
Social security payments have, over the years, allowed many Aboriginal
people, as individuals and as groups, to undertake activities which might
not otherwise have been viable (see, for example, Gilbert 1973: 166-82;
Bell 1978; Sanders 1986: 153-82; Coombs, McCann, Ross and Williams
1989: 25). The amount identified in Table 1 as social security expenditure
on Aborigines, a mere $7.3 million, is simply for a number of small
ancillary programs intended to improve Aboriginal access to mainstream
social security programs. The same could probably also be said for much of
the funding in mainstream Commonwealth portfolios in the bottom half of
Table 1. The amounts are not great. The programs involved are not best
seen as major sources of resources for Aborigines, but rather as ancillary
ways in which these departments sensitise their larger, more mainstream
operations and programs to the presence and particular needs of the
Aboriginal portion of their clientele.
Amount
This brings me to the third reason for regarding more positively the current
institutions of mainstream service provision and the multiplicity of funding
agencies for Aborigines. The argument here is quite simply that Aboriginal
people do at present, and will in the long run, get far more resources to
pursue their goals from large mainstream social policy organisations than
they ever will from smaller Aboriginal-specific ones. Again, while social
security is the most obvious example, there are many others as well. For
example, one recent DEET compilation of statistics suggested that only one
in five Aboriginal clients accessing its Commonwealth Employment
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Service was presently being put on an Aboriginal-specific program;
compared with one in three a year ago (The Job Report May 1993: 6-7).
There was, it seemed, a trend for Aboriginal people to be placed on
mainstream programs, thereby increasing the amount of resources
potentially available to Aborigines, and also decreasing the visibility of that
expenditure. Clearly, the amount of resources both currently and
potentially available to Aborigines through mainstream government service
organisations should not be lightly disregarded by those thinking about the
future direction of social policy for indigenous Australians.
Diversity of Aboriginal circumstances
A fourth rationale for maintaining a strong mainstream element in service
delivery for Aborigines, and hence the multiplicity of agencies involved, is
the diversity of circumstances in which Aborigines find themselves and the
possible diversity of their aspirations arising from these circumstances.
Aboriginal circumstances in Australia today span a vast continuum: from
the most remote, and still largely separate, to the most urbanised and
massively enveloped. Along the continuum there are Aborigines who may
have very different and varied aspirations. Some may seek virtual total
incorporation into the larger economy and society, as full-time individual
wage earners, entrepreneurs, professionals and so on. Others may seek
varying degrees of partial incorporation, with lesser levels of employment
and income and more time for distinctly Aboriginal pursuits. To allow for
this range of choices, a diversity and multiplicity of potential organisational
sources of support may be a great asset. Some Aboriginal people may
prefer to draw on the predominantly individualised services of mainstream
government departments, while others may wish to draw on the more
community-based support of ATSIC and other Aboriginal affairs bodies.
Contrary to some writers, for example Mowbray (1990), I do not consider
mainstream service provision as necessarily equivalent to 'assimilation'.
Potential for reform: programs, not agencies
This more positive perspective on mainstreaming and the multiplicity of
agencies now involved in servicing Aborigines should not be construed as
suggesting that there is no room for the reform of present arrangements in
social policy towards indigenous Australians. Clearly, there is. This room
for reform is primarily at the level of programs, rather than agencies. All
agencies should be further encouraged to take responsibility for servicing
Aborigines as well, and as appropriately, as they do their non-Aboriginal
clientele. This is current Commonwealth government policy under its
Access and Equity Strategy (Commonwealth of Australia 1992a: 34;
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 1992). There is, then, very
little prospect of reducing numbers of agencies involved in servicing
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Aborigines, and every prospect of an increase. Programs, however, are
another matter.
One clear potential area for program reform is within ATSIC itself. The
Commonwealth Aboriginal affairs portfolio, during the early years of its
existence, virtually replicated the whole range of government functional
areas in its program structure. It has, in recent years, largely continued to
do so, as can be seen from the broad functional spread of Aboriginal affairs
portfolio programs listed in brackets in the first column of Table 2. hi the
early days, this program structure may have been a useful way of second
guessing and encouraging mainstream departments to become involved in
servicing Aborigines. However, now that many of these mainstream
departments have taken up that challenge, to some significant degree, such
a program structure may no longer be so desirable. ATSIC should, I would
argue, be trying to use its program structure more strategically - to fill gaps,
or to create programs which are quite different from those provided by
mainstream departments, rather than simply replicating their program
structures. This has begun to happen in recent years, but only slowly. It has
been harder for ATSIC and its predecessors to remove old programs than to
begin new ones.
One example of significant program change in the Aboriginal affairs
portfolio of recent years has been the rise of the CDEP scheme, referred to
earlier. The scheme dates from the late 1970s, but has grown enormously
over the last ten years. In 1991-92 it accounted for 35 per cent of the
ATSIC budget and 20,000 Aboriginal workers in 185 communities - up
from 4 per cent, 1,300 workers and 18 communities a decade ago. This has
clearly been a major program change which has taken ATSIC some way
towards making 'block grants' to the Aboriginal communities involved. The
CDEP grant is often by far the biggest source of funds flowing directly to a
participating Aboriginal community association/council, and because of the
nature of the scheme, as a notional equivalent of social security
entitlements, it gives these organisations considerable power to assert their
independence in deciding what community members should work on and
how (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 1993).
Another example of a more recent program reform within ATSIC has been
the amalgamation of housing and community infrastructure into one
program area, the Community Housing and Infrastructure Program (CHIP),
comprising some 30 per cent of ATSIC's total budget. This proportion
could increase further over the next year or so, as Commonwealth/State
Housing Agreement money for Aboriginal Rental Housing is transferred
from the mainstream Commonwealth Housing portfolio to ATSIC.
With CHIP and CDEP together now constituting some two-thirds of the
total ATSIC program budget, and potentially even more in the near future,
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there is some truth in the view that a significant degree of block grant
funding does already exist within ATSIC, though clearly not within
government as a whole. There is also some prospect of this approach being
further developed within ATSIC, particularly as there is now some talk of
attempting to integrate the CHIP and CDEP programs.
A third area of potential program reform within ATSIC would seem to
flow from the presence of regional councils within the Commission's
structure. Presently these councils only control a small percentage of
ATSIC expenditure (Smith 1993). However, there are clear pressures and
moves afoot within the Commission which may see this amount increase
significantly in the next few years. Some have suggested that ATSIC might
adopt a 'geographic approach' to its program structure within this regional
framework, and largely do away with its functional program structure
(Dillon 1992: 102, ATSIC Reporter, June/July 1993: 7; see also Altman and
Sanders 1991: 16). This is certainly an approach worthy of further
exploration.
Conclusion
In summary, I argue against any idea that social policy towardsindigenous
Australians needs fundamental rethinking along the lines of block grants
and a single funding source. On the whole, I defend the current situation,
with all its multiplicity of funding and service agencies, its vagueness of
responsibilities and apparent lack of coordination. However, I do recognise
significant potential for reform, particularly in the area of ATSIC's program
structure. In arguing for the maintenance of the present situation, I do not
deny the difficulties encountered by Aboriginal community-based
associations and councils when they have to deal with large numbers of
government agencies in order to gain access to services and funding. I
simply point out that this multiplicity of agencies and lack of clarity over
responsibilities has its benefits, as well as its costs. Anyone who is
interested in rethinking social policy towards indigenous Australians
should bear this in mind.
Notes
1. The terms Aboriginal and Aborigines are used throughout to refer to all
indigenous Australians, including Torres Strait Islanders.
2. CDEP expenditure is currently around 35 per cent of the total ATSIC budget,
however, a little less than one-third of this amount is 'on-cost' and 'support'
money, leaving roughly 25 per cent of ATSIC's budget as notionally a DSS offset.
15
References
Altman, J.C. and Sanders, W. 1991. 'From exclusion to dependence: Aborigines and the
welfare state in Australia', CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 1, Centre for Aboriginal
Economic Policy Research, Australian National University, Canberra.
Altman, J.C. and Smith, D.E. 1993. The welfare dependence of Aboriginal
Australians', Social Security Journal, March 1993.
Arthur, W.S. 1991. 'Funding allocations to Aboriginal people: the Western Australian
case', CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 15, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy
Research, Australian National University, Canberra.
Bell, D. 1978. 'For our families: the Kurindi walk-off and the Ngurrantji venture',
Aboriginal History, 2 (1): 32-62.
Commonwealth of Australia 199la. Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in
Custody, National Report, vol. 2, (Commissioner E. Johnston), Australian
Government PublishingService, Canberra.
Commonwealth of Australia 1991b. Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in
Custody, National Report, vol. 4, (Commissioner E. Johnston), Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
Commonwealth of Australia 1992a. Social Justice For Indigenous Australians, Budget
Related Paper No. 7, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
Commonwealth of Australia 1992b. Aboriginal Deaths in Custody: Response by
Governments to the Royal Commission, Australian Government Publishing Service,
Canberra.
Coombs, H.C., McCann, H., Ross, H. and Williams, N.M. (Editors) 1989. Land of
Promises: Aborigines and Development in the East Kimberley, Centre for Resource
and Environmental Studies, Australian National University and Aboriginal Studies
Press, Canberra.
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 1993. No Reverse Gear: A National Review of the
Community Development Employment Projects Scheme, Report to the Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission, Canberra.
Department of Aboriginal Affairs 1987. Aboriginal Statistics 1986, Australian
Government PublishingService, Canberra.
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 1992. Access and Equity Evaluation
Report 1992, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
Dillon, M.C. 1992. 'Program evaluation and monitoring in Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander affairs: a strategic overview', in C. O'Faircheallaigh and B. Ryan (eds)
Program Evaluation and Performance Monitoring: An Australian Perspective,
Macmillan, Melbourne.
Gerritsen, R. 1982a. 'Blackfellas and whitfellas', in P. Loveday (ed.) Service Delivery to
Remote Communities, North Australia Research Unit, Darwin.
Gerritsen, R. 1982b. 'Outstations, differing interpretations and policy implications', in
P. Loveday (ed.) Service Delivery to Outstations, North Australia Research Unit,
Darwin.
16
Gerritsen, R. 1990. 'A continuing confusion? A comment on the appropriate dispersal
of policy powers in the Australian federation', Australian Journal of Political
Science, 25 (2): 228-40.
Gilbert, K.J. 1973. Because a White Man'll Never Do It, Angus and Robertson, Sydney.
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs 1990. Our Future,
Our Selves: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Community Control, Management
and Resources, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
Mowbray, M. 1990. 'Mainstreaming as assimilation in the Northern Territory',
Australian Aboriginal Studies, 1990/2: 20-6.
Sanders, W. 1991. 'Aboriginal affairs', in B. Galligan, O. Hughes and C. Walsh (eds)
Intergovernmental Relations and Public Policy, Allen and Unwin, Sydney.
Sanders, W.G. 1986. Access, Administration and Politics: The Australian Social
Security System and Aborigines, unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National
University, Canberra.
Smith, D.E. 1992. 'Estimating Northern Territory government program expenditure for
Aboriginal people: problems and policy implications', CAEPR Discussion Paper No.
30, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National
University, Canberra.
Smith, D.E. 1993. 'ATSIC's mechanisms for resource allocation: current policy and
practice', CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 41, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy
Research, Australian National University, Canberra.
Tonkinson, R. and Howard, M. (Editors) 1990. Going it Alone? Prospects for
Aboriginal Autonomy, Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra.


RECENT CENTRE FOR ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC POLICY
RESEARCH (CAEPR) DISCUSSION PAPERS
19/1992 Estimating the reliance of Aboriginal Australians on welfare: some policy
implications, J.C. Altman and D.E. Smith.
20/1992 Establishing trends in ATSIC regional council populations using census
data: a cautionary note, J.C. Altman and K.H.W.Gaminiratne.
21/1992 Do fluctuations in the Australian macroeconomy influence Aboriginal
employment status?, J.C. Altman and A.E. Daly.
22/1992 Industry segregation among employed Aborigines and Torres Strait
Islanders, J. Taylor.
23/1992 The evaluation of labour market programs: some issues for Aboriginal
policy formulation from experience in the United States, A.E. Daly.
*
24/1992 First counts, 1991 Census: a comment on Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander population growth, K.H.W. Gaminiratne.
25/1992 Patterns and trends in the spatial diffusion of the Torres Strait Islander
population, J. Taylor and W.S. Arthur.
26/1992 Aborigines, tourism and sustainable development, J.C. Altman and J.
Finlayson.
27/1992 Political spoils or political largesse? Regional development in northern
Quebec, Canada and Australia's Northern Territory, C. Scott.
28/1992 Survey or census? Estimation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
housing need in large urban areas, J. Taylor.
29/1992 An analysis of the Aboriginal component of Commonwealth fiscal flows to
the Northern Territory, D.E. Smith.
30/1992 Estimating Northern Territory Government program expenditure for
Aboriginal people: problems and implications, D.E. Smith.
31/1992 Estimating Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander fertility from census data,
K.W.H. Gaminiratne.
32/1992 The determinants of Aboriginal employment income, A.E. Daly.
33/1992 Occupational segregation: a comparison between employed Aborigines,
Torres Strait Islanders and other Australians, J. Taylor.
34/1992 Aboriginal population change in remote Australia, 1986-91: data issues, J.
Taylor.
35/1992 A comparison of the socioeconomic characteristics of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander people, J. Taylor and K.H.W. Gaminiratne.
36/1992 The CDEP scheme: a census-based analysis of the labour market status of
participants in 1986, J.C. Altman and A.E. Daly.
37/1993 Indigenous Australians in the National Tourism Strategy: impact,
sustainability and policy issues, J.C. Altman.
38/1993 Education and employment for young Aborigines, A.E.Daly.
39/1993 Self-employment amongst Aboriginal people, A.E.Daly.
40/1993 Aboriginal socioeconomic change in the Northern Territory, 1986-91, J.
Taylor.
41/1993 ATSIC's mechanisms for resource allocation: current policy and practice,
D.E. Smith.
42/1993 The fiscal equalisation model: options for ATSIC's future funding policy and
practice, D.E. Smith.
43/1993 The position of older Aboriginal people in the labour market, A.E. Daly.
44/1993 Determining the labour force status of Aboriginal people using a
multinomial logit model, A.E. Daly, B. Allen, L. Aufflick, E. Bosworth, and
M. Caruso.
45/1993 Indigenous Australians and the labour market: issues for the union
movement in the 1990s, J.C. Altman and A.E. Hawke.
46/1993 Rethinking the fundamentals of social policy towards indigenous
Australians: block grants, mainstreaming and the multiplicity of agencies
and programs, W. Sanders.
47/1993 Compensating indigenous Australian 'losers': a community-oriented
approach from the Aboriginal policy arena, J.C. Altman and D.E. Smith.
48/1993 Work and welfare for indigenous Australians, A.E. Daly and A.E. Hawke.
49/1993 Change in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population distribution,
1986-91, K.H.W. Gaminiratne.
For information on earlier CAEPR Discussion Papers contact Nicky Lumb, Centre
for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Faculty of Arts, Australian National
University, Canberra ACT 0200. Ph (06) 249 0587 Fax (06) 249 2789.


